. The committee will come to order. Today, we

consider the future of United States relations with Russia in the

aftermath of the crisis that erupted with sudden ferocity in the Republic

of Georgia 5 weeks ago.

But before looking ahead, we also need to look back more than

5 weeks to understand what role United States policy toward Russia

and Georgia played in setting the stage for these events.

Over the last few months, the international community watched

with increasing concern as the Russian Government sought to provoke

Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili through an escalating

series of questionable legal and military actions. Russia established

official ties with the separatist government in Abkhazia, issuing

passports and citizenship to its residents. Then Moscow dispatched

a military jet to down a Georgian reconnaissance craft, and it deployed

railway troops to Abkhazia under dubious pretenses. When

this failed to stimulate a reaction from the Georgians, the Russians

sought to destabilize South Ossetia instead.

On August 8th, the world watched the sad climax of months of

provocation. Television screens were filled with the sickening juxtaposition

of Russian tanks rolling across Georgian soil while the

world celebrated peace and harmony during the opening ceremonies

of the Beijing Olympics.

President Saakashvili’s decision to take Russia’s bait and engage

militarily was a terrible blunder. But before we render too harsh

a judgment, consider the intensifying provocations that the Georgian

Government faced, including reports of ethnic cleansing in

South Ossetia.

Russia’s use of disproportionate force and its failure to respond

to two Georgian cease-fire offers made it painfully clear that its

goal was not to protect its supposed citizens in South Ossetia, as

it claimed, but, rather, to remove the democratically elected leader

of a sovereign nation. As evidenced by Russian President

Medvedev’s recent comments, that effort continues.

Two weeks after the conflict started, our colleague, George Miller,

and I went to Tbilisi at the request of Speaker Pelosi to dem2

onstrate solidarity with the Georgian people and to deliver humanitarian

aid. We met the President and other top officials, and we affirmed

that the sovereignty of Georgia should be respected, and the

integrity of its borders should be restored.

Indeed, I am pleased to see in the audience today—I think the

Ambassador of Georgia is here, and I know I saw David Bakradze,

the chairman of the Georgian Parliament and several of his colleagues.

We very much appreciate your diplomatic efforts on behalf

of your country.

While it is important to acknowledge the agreement reached yesterday

between French President Sarkozy and President Medvedev

regarding the withdrawal of Russian troops from undisputed Georgian

territory, the refusal of President Medvedev to reconsider his

decision recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South

Ossetia is quite troubling. This action violates legal principles of

territorial integrity.

While historians and military analysts will long debate who fired

the first shot in the August skirmish, there are two key questions

before the committee today. First, how can we rebuild Georgia most

quickly and effectively? Second, how should we reassess United

States-Russian relations in the aftermath of Russia’s use of disproportionate

force against its sovereign neighbor?

Last week President Bush presented his assistance package for

Georgia. While a robust response to the economic and humanitarian

crisis is welcome, and while there is strong bipartisan support

for delivering urgently needed aid to an ally, there should be

a serious discussion about the activities to be funded and the budget

authorities to be used.

I note that the administration’s package contains nothing to

strengthen the accountability, inclusiveness, and transparency of

Georgia’s political institutions. Such omissions have previously

been identified as a weakness of United States policy toward Georgia.

Now would be an appropriate time to rectify this oversight.

There has also been resounding silence from the White House

thus far on the issue of military assistance. While I understand

that the Department of Defense currently has an assessment team

in Georgia, it would be helpful to know whether the administration

is planning to provide such aid. If so, will it be basic replenishment

of armaments damaged in the recent conflict? Will it allow Georgia

the ability to participate in foreign missions such as Iraq? Or will

it provide the capacity for self-defense in case of future attacks?

Given the asymmetrical nature of the Russian and Georgian forces,

just what kinds of arms could possibly give Tbilisi the ability to defend

itself from future incursions?

If Georgia is to remain a viable candidate for NATO membership,

it will require significant assistance in rebuilding its military. To

me, it seems that our approach to the Bucharest Summit in April

produced the worst possible outcome. The administration pushed

for Georgia to receive a Membership Action Plan, knowing full well

that this step would be blocked by the Germans and the French.

As a consolation prize, the final communique´ expressed NATO’s intent

to admit Georgia to the alliance eventually. Did this decision

signal to the Russians that Georgia has no current security guarantees,

but would eventually be covered by Article V protection, and

that therefore this was the time for Russia to set the trap to ‘‘justify’’

an immediate attack?

Here is the depressing truth: By all rights we should be doing

everything possible to reassure our friends in Ukraine, Poland, the

Baltic States, and elsewhere in the region that they will not fall

victim to similar acts of Russian aggression. But at this particular

moment in history, the ability to provide that protection is under

serious question.

If the administration does not have a military strategy in place,

then I hope they at least have a diplomatic one. It seems odd that

no senior American official has bothered to visit Russia before, during,

or after the conflict. We have been reassured by the White

House that—in the administration’s own words—‘‘the Russians

know our position.’’ Well, clearly they either did not know or did

not care.

Since then, the administration has issued strong condemnations

but the actions have failed to live up to its rhetoric. Administration

policy toward Russia seems to be: Speak loudly, carry a small stick.

The question we must urgently address is what our future relationship

with Russia is going to look like. If the primary goal of

Russian foreign policy is to thwart the American diplomatic agenda,

then how can we expect Moscow to be a reliable partner in

dealing with the many international challenges we face?

On the other hand, if Russian behavior is largely a response to

our failure to prioritize this bilateral relationship and to seek cooperation

on the key challenges—and here I speak most particularly

of Iran’s nuclear weapons program—then don’t we need to review

and recalibrate how we have been handling this relationship?

It is now my pleasure to turn to the distinguished ranking member,

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, for any opening comments she may wish

to make.

. If the gentlelady would just yield on that

issue——

. I will give her unanimous consent for an additional

minute, if she will yield to me. I would then respond.

I, actually, had much more notice about this than you did—I

learned Friday morning—and I certainly confirm, this is not a Foreign

Affairs Committee document. It was prepared by a group of

people, including staff of the majority, but it, in no way, should be

viewed as representing a Foreign Affairs Committee publication. I

would contest the conclusion, having now read it, that it is slanted,

but that, of course, is my slant.

. Sure.

. That seal looks forged to me.

. It has one less wing. Look, I will try to understand

what was distributed, but here is what I will say. It does

refer to the majority staff, but, to the extent it has the imprimatur

of the committee, we have committee rules to deal with committee

publications, and those rules should be complied with, and, to the

extent it went out in the form you have showed me, that raises serious

questions, and I will check into it.

. Okay. Our first panel features Ambassador

Fried, and then we have an excellent panel of two experts next. So,

because of the importance of the subject, I am going to allow 1-

minute opening statements for those members who feel compelled

to do so.

Obviously, we will have questions after each of the panels. So,

to the extent you can defer, that would be great so we can get to

the panel, but, to the extent you want to make a 1-minute opening

statement now—and I realize that is not much time—I am willing

to recognize anybody.

Mr. Sherman of California is recognized for 1 minute.

. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized.

. Without objection, Mr. Flake’s 1 minute is

incorporated into your 1 minute, and you get 11⁄2 minutes. Just

kidding.

. The time of the gentleman from Arizona and

the gentleman from California has expired.

. Any further people? The gentlelady from

California, Ms. Watson.

. The time of the gentlelady has expired.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Royce.

. The gentleman’s time has expired. Mr.

Faleomavaega, the gentleman from American Samoa, is recognized

for 1 minute.

. All right. The gentlelady from Texas is recognized.

. The time of the gentlelady has expired.

The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Crane. The gentleman from

Texas, Mr. Paul. Fifteen years ago, I would have been right.

. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt, is recognized.

. The gentleman’s time has expired. Does anyone

else on the minority side seek recognition? The gentleman from

New Jersey, Mr. Smith, is recognized for 1 minute.

. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Who else seeks recognition? The gentleman from Georgia, Mr.

Scott, for 1 minute.

. The time of the gentleman has more than expired.

. Good. You will have a chance to ask them.

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Klein, is recognized for 1

minute.

. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from American Samoa is now recognized.

. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from New Jersey is recognized for 1 minute, Mr.

Payne.

. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Who else seeks recognition? The gentleman from Texas, Mr.

Green, is recognized for 1 minute.

. Without objection.

. The chair, seeing no other members seeking

recognition, would like to introduce the witnesses. We have, as I

said earlier, two excellent panels today.

Our first witness is a familiar face before this committee. We

were fortunate to have Ambassador Daniel Fried testify on the

Caucasus in June. We welcome him back today to revisit this important

region, albeit under rather sad circumstances, given the recent

conflict.

Ambassador Daniel Fried is the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau

of European and Eurasian Affairs of the Department of State.

He previously served as Special Assistant to the President and senior

director for European and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security

Council.

During his distinguished career at the Department of State, Ambassador

Fried has worked in the former Soviet Union and as a

senior adviser on European policy for multiple administrations. He

served as U.S. Ambassador to Poland from November 1997 through

May 2000.

Welcome back, Ambassador Fried.

I will also just introduce our second panel now, hopefully to entice

some of my colleagues on the committee to stay because we

have two really good witnesses.

Our first witness is Michael McFaul, one of the foremost experts

on modern Russia and its politics. Dr. McFaul is a senior fellow at

the Hoover Institution, where he co-directs the Iran Democracy

Project. He is also a professor of political science and the director

of the Center on Democracy Development and Rule of Law at Stanford

University. Dr. McFaul is the author and editor of numerous

books and articles on Russian and Eastern European politics. He

serves on the board of directors for multiple think tanks and international

organizations.

Our second witness is Frederick Kagan, a prominent military

historian with expertise on Russian and European military history.

Dr. Kagan is a resident scholar in defense and security policy studies

at the American Enterprise Institute, where he specializes in

defense transformation, strategy, and warfare. Previously an associate

professor at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Dr.

Kagan is the author of a number of books and articles and is a contributing

editor at the Weekly Standard.

So we thank both of you for being here, and, Ambassador Fried,

why don’t you begin with your testimony? Your entire statement

will be put into the record. We will hear from you and then have

a round of questions.

. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. I

will recognize myself for 5 minutes.

Just real quickly, I am a little unclear. The aid you have announced—

you are providing some humanitarian assistance now—

but the aid you have announced, as a result of reprogramming already

appropriated funds, is about $550 million, all of it economic

assistance, none of it military assistance. Am I right about that?

. And then you want an authorization for a

total of $1 billion, to include a second tranche of economic assistance

at some point next year. Is that correct?

. Just to clarify, what is the administration’s

position on military assistance at this point?

. Okay.

. All right. I am told that there is some intelligence

that Russian tanks were in the Roki Tunnel——

[continuing]. The Roki Tunnel at the time of

the Georgian military attack on Tskhinvali. Is that right?

. And this is before the attack on Tskhinvali.

. All right. In other words, you do not have

independent verification of that fact at this time.

. Okay. There are reports that U.N. agencies—

UNICEF, UNDP, WFP—were denied access by Russian

troops at the Karaleti checkpoint between Gori and the administrative

border of South Ossetia for at least 10 days now and that

OSCE was denied access to all areas around South Ossetia, including

an area they had not had problems patrolling before. Is this accurate,

that, for purposes of dealing with humanitarian issues in

South Ossetia and in some of these buffer areas, that U.N. agencies

have been denied access by Russian troops. Is that correct?

. And my last question is, can you give me a

date when the U.N. Security Council is convening on a fourth

round of enhanced sanctions against Iran, based on its refusal to

go along with the most recent P5-plus-1 proposal?

. Is it appropriate to conclude that our efforts

to work with Russia to strengthen a multilateral level of sanctions

to try and persuade Iran to change its behavior are a casualty of

this conflict?

. Well, at some point, at some time, but not

now, I would love to know your hopes in that regard.

. Thank you. The ranking member of the committee,

the gentlelady from Florida, is recognized for 5 minutes.

. The time of the gentlelady has expired.

This is under the procedures that the committee has been operating

under. The members who were here at the time of the gavel

get the first crack, and the gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman,

is recognized for 5 minutes. Well, that is the other part of the

procedure, if you are not here.

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 5 minutes.

. The time of the gentleman has expired. The

bells for three votes have gone off. I am going to recognize a member

of the minority, Mr. Rohrabacher, for 5 minutes, and then we

will recess for probably about 30 minutes. It will be a recess, but

we will be back and ready to see it through.

. The time of the gentleman has expired. I do

not believe that was a question, and the committee is in recess for

approximately 30 minutes.

. The committee will come to order. Since the

only people here are—Mr. Royce is here. I was hoping to get the

last two questions I had in.

Secretary Fried, I am curious about something. Was the Patriot

missile battery part of the missile defense that we were talking

about deploying in Poland to deal with Iranian nuclear-tipped missiles?

. No, no. I mean, in the original announcement

of our intention to deploy a missile defense system to deal

with Iranian nuclear-tipped missiles—remember all of that?

. This is not focused on Russia; this is focused

on Iran.

. Did that include a Patriot battery?

. Okay. That answers one of my two questions.

I think we now have enough people who have not asked any

questions, and I ought to stop.

The last person to question was Mr. Rohrabacher, and so Mr.

Sherman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.

. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Royce, is recognized for 5

minutes.

. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Sires.

. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Paul, is recognized for 5 minutes.

. The time is yielded back. The gentleman

from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt, is recognized for 5 minutes.

. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Smith, is recognized for 5

minutes.

. Your microphone.

. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Perhaps Mr. Faleomavaega, who is going to be recognized for 5

minutes, would want to yield you 10 or so seconds.

. I think the gentleman from Massachusetts

wanted to have the last word.

. The gentleman from American Samoa is recognized

for 4 minutes and 30 seconds.

. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Fortenberry, is recognized for

5 minutes.

. The gentleman yields back, and the

gentlelady from California, Ambassador Watson, is recognized for

5 minutes.

. The time of the gentlelady has expired.

Would it be correct to say that you do continue to support Georgia

and Ukraine’s request for the Membership Action Plan?

. The time of the gentlelady has expired.

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Poe, is recognized for 5 minutes.

. The time of the gentleman has expired, and

our last questioner of this witness, and before our next panel, is

the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne.

. You cannot explain what he said any more

that you could explain why the Georgians did what they did.

. The time of the gentleman has expired.

I thank you very much. There are questions that, if we were not

so late in the afternoon, I would like to ask you, but I think I will

try and do that more informally or in writing.

. Thank you. Professors?

. I apologize for the late time that you have

been asked to come up here, but I know that will not affect the

quality of your testimony. It just may affect the tenacity of the

questioners.

You have both been introduced. Dr. McFaul, why don’t you start?

. The entire testimony will be in the record.

. Very good. Dr. Kagan?

. Say that again. The ‘‘what’’ does not threaten?

. Well, you both have given us a lot to think

about, and, unfortunately, because of the circumstances of the 24

hours since I have been in this town, I did not have a chance to

read either of your testimonies before now, and I intend to do that.

Let me throw out a couple of things on my time now, and then

we will hear from others, and maybe I will have a few more things

after we go through one round.

Let us start with your last point. I do not know much about that

business of conventional deterrence. It sounds quite improbable

that there is any level of arms we could provide the Georgians or,

for that matter, the Ukrainians that, if for no other reason than

constraining the Russians, those arms would deter Russia from

doing something they decided they wanted to do.

Is that my ignorance, or are you overestimating the ability to create

that kind of deterrent?

. Push that a little bit. Forget all of Ukraine.

Just talk about Crimea.

Apparently, Pravda told the world how they planned to do it.

. But, in any event, what I could draw from

what you said is, not only should we provide military assistance,

but it should not be with the notion of replenishing that which they

have lost but of seriously upgrading the quality of the equipment,

the level of the training, the strategic advice on how to posture

against a Russian threat, and that replenishing what they had before

might be the closest thing to wasting money one could do.

. Dr. McFaul?

. And as you have described it, since my time

will run out, your answer can deal with that, but also, at one point

you triggered something on a cease-fire. Is it your understanding

that compliance with the cease-fire is getting out of nondisputed

parts of Georgia and quit fighting? Or is it getting Russians out of

South Ossetia and Abkhazia?

. Recognizing you have not fully responded to

that or answered my question, I am going to cut myself off because

I am 1 minute and 20 seconds over. I will give the other people

who are valiant to remain the same time, and we will come back

to it.

. The gentleman from American Samoa.

. Could you yield for 1 second?

. When you check out the speeches—you have

mentioned Medvedev’s—check out the Putin speech in Munich,

about 2 years ago. That was also profound, in a way.

. No. We are being lax here.

. Mr. Payne, for as much time as he may consume—

well, no, no.

. Up to about 8 or 9 minutes.

. And now, in what will surely be an historical

novelty, Mr. Rohrabacher, bring us the perspective of Russia that

you have been talking about.

[continuing]. Top notch.

. The issue has been joined.

. Will the gentleman yield?

. Just yield 1 second.

. Do the Kurds, who were thrown out of Mosul

by Saddam Hussein, have a right to participate in the future of

Mosul?

. Russians in Kazakhstan?

. Do Russians in Kazakhstan have a right

to——

. Twice, the time of the gentleman from California,

with a few interruptions by me, has expired.

The gentleman from Massachusetts?

. I thank you, Mr. Delahunt, for a segue into

the question that I would like to get into.

For a long time, a couple of years—actually, it has only been

since I became chairman as before that I was thinking about fair

use with intellectual property—I have been thinking, Has our policy

to Russia been handled right? I agree with what you are saying.

I see the thuggish behavior, I see the reporters getting assassinated,

and I see the NGOs being stifled. I see the television press

being taken over by the government, and it is very depressing.

I see the administration’s policies—I call them ‘‘stovepiping’’—

and maybe that is unfair. Well, we like missile defense. We have

loved missile defense. It is almost a religious thing. Iran could have

nuclear weapons, certainly is getting missile technology. Let us use

our missile defense to stop those nuclear-tipped missiles, and there

is a reason to deploy them where we are talking about deploying,

but the Russian feelings about that do not make that much sense.

Kosovo is a critical humanitarian issue, I think. I do not think

it is the equivalent of the situation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,

but I know there are going to be consequences from it. What are

we doing to deal with those consequences?

For me, it gets back a lot to Iran with a nuclear weapons capability,

both because of who is in control of Iran and because of what

that will mean for Iranian efforts at hegemony in that part of the

world. And for the reason that once Iran goes, a number of other

countries are going to now seriously focus on getting nuclear weapons.

Iran, in some ways, is the most urgent. Maybe it is not immediate,

but it is closer to immediate than most other things around.

I hear you say, ‘‘They will do, Iran, what they want to do, and we

should never reward aggression, and do not kid ourselves into

thinking that.’’ I do not want to reward aggression, and I do not

think Georgia and Russia are morally equivalent in this case. I do

think we have to stand up, and that is where I do think we have

to provide this assistance.

In Iraq, our military—and I think it was a brilliant and right

move—paid off some people who had been involved in trying to kill

American soldiers, taking advantage of their own disaffection with

al-Qaeda in Iraq and doing the kind of thing that would have put

any of us in jail with their walking-around money to help build

support. We rewarded some people who had done some evil things

for a greater good.

World War II is the classic example of making book with Stalin,

when the Germans finally double-crossed him, to stop the Nazis. I

could agree with everything you say about Russia now and still

think, with the importance of some of these other issues, one has

to think about the relationship of all of them. Maybe on some

issues, you do not give. You do not turn your back on Georgia after

what has happened, but maybe there are other aspects of it where

you pull your punches a little bit in order to achieve a bigger goal.

We know that Russia and Iran have always had an historical

tension. We know that Russia knows it is not in their national interest

for Iran to get nuclear weapons. They may be more interested

as I said in my opening statement, in thwarting U.S. policy.

I mean, they are so upset about the humiliations they went

through and our role in contributing to them, some of the issues

Dana mentioned in the 1990s, and their anger at a unipolar world,

that nothing we do will get them to cooperate. That is what this

search is partly about because if there is nothing that will get them

on our side, then that ought to be our frame of reference.

But maybe, to some extent, we have contributed or have not done

things well enough to maximize the chance of them helping us. I

think their help is absolutely essential, unless this is going to be

a military issue with Iran, but I think their help is absolutely essential.

Maybe there are ways we could work through that relationship

with Russia better to achieve our goals.

So, in addition to what has happened to the Georgian people, and

what has happened to a nascent democracy, part of what depresses

me about the events of this summer is, it seems to me, to have put

the nail in the coffin of that kind of collaboration on Iran, and one

non-military way I saw of forcing an Iranian change of behavior is

lost.

Have I used my time? I guess I have. I am getting twice the time

now. So I would be interested in your reaction, and, in the course

of it, I would like to get back to that earlier question about what

is a cease-fire versus moving their forces out of South Ossetia and

Abkhazia? What is our standard here, as we move ahead in dealing

with Russia? What is the European standard? Okay.

. Sure.

. The recognition is?

. But it seemed to me that the cease-fire was

fuzzy about that.

The meaning of ‘‘is’’ is, no.

. But then there was a clarification of the

cease-fire.

. So the recognition violates the cease-fire because——

. And tell me why.

. Okay.

. Obviously, we are talking about different

cease-fires. There was a 1994 cease-fire.

. But if you are talking about the Sarkozy

cease-fire——

. Let us bring it back to my question.

. Seventeen years ago.

. In the theater we were always interested in

because they have impacts.

. No.

. No, no, no. I want to just clarify my point.

I am thinking, in the confines of what this administration is willing

to consider, which seems to be wedded to a specific program of

modestly enhanced sanctions, which is dribbling along while every

day Iran enriches, but that is——

. All discipline, including mine, is gone,

frittered away.

. Well, it was a yield. Okay. The gentlelady

from Texas, which is going to be, I think, our sort of final gasp on

this, other than parting words, Ms. Jackson Lee’s questions or

about Mr. Delahunt’s comment about trash talk.

. A very interesting question.

. I appreciate the gentlelady yielding.

The administration has announced that they intend to seek permission,

reprogramming permission in other words, not a supplemental

appropriation but a reprogramming of what they hope will

be $1 billion, but, for this fiscal year, will be 500-and-something

million dollars, a little more than half. It will fund different kinds

of economic assistance, some of it infrastructure repairs, some of it

humanitarian assistance, refugee assistance, other things like that.

The funds will come from various different accounts, which, by the

way, is a very interesting question. To the extent they take it from

freedom-support accounts devoted to democracy building in, believe

it or not, Russia, I could see President Medvedev, or, more likely,

Prime Minister Putin, saying, ‘‘Hit me again with that one. Take

away those NGOs’ money. You know, you are really punishing me

with that move.’’ But, in any event, I digress.

So we are thinking, however, of putting forth, and I need to talk

to the leadership. We are thinking about putting forth an authorization

bill to provide, to authorize, some of these programs as well

as some of the democracy-in-Georgia programs that have been referenced

up until now. But no final decision has been made.

The money is coming from?

. Absolutely.

. You will not believe it, but part of it is coming

from Iraq.

. Okay. We talked about Medvedev’s five principles.

I had thought he said a sphere of influence among Russia’s

neighbors and protection of Russian citizens anywhere. I may be

wrong about that, but it sounded like one of you conflated that to

be protection of Russian citizens in Russia’s neighbors.

. Including West Hollywood.

. Okay. That is my point: It was not limited

geographically.

. With that, this is the last 5-hour hearing of

. You want more.